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Abstract Sentences involving disjunction under epistemic modal adjectives — such
as possible, likely, and certain — give rise to the inference that the disjuncts are epis-
temically possible. Inferences of this sort are often classified and treated differently,
depending on the force of the embedding modal. Those triggered by possibility
modals are singled out as ‘free choice inferences’ (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002,
Klinedinst 2007, Fox 2007, Chierchia 2013, a.o.), while those triggered by stronger
modals are called and accounted for in a different way (Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007,
Crnic et al. 2015 a.o.). In this paper, we pursue two goals. First, we develop and
defend a degree semantics for epistemic modal adjectives, building on much recent
work on the topic (Yalcin 2010, Lassiter 2011, 2014, Moss 2015a, Swanson 2015,
a.o.). Second, we show that this semantics, in combination with the assumption
that scalar implicatures can arise in embedded position (Fox 2007, Chierchia et al.
2012 a.o.), can predict all the inferences triggered by disjunction under modals,
including free choice ones, via a uniform mechanism. We conclude by outlining how
the proposal can be extended to epistemic modal items in other syntactic categories,
and to modals of different flavor.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The inferences of disjunction under epistemic modals: an overview
Disjunctions in the scope of epistemic modal expressions give rise to scalar infer-
ences to the effect that each disjunct is epistemically possible. For example, all the
sentences in (1a)-(1c) are naturally heard as suggesting that the sentences in (2a)
and (2b) are true.
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Cariani, Jennifer Carr, Danny Fox, Melissa Fusco, Clemens Mayr, Paul Portner, Alexis Wellwood, and
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(1) a. It’s possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
b. It’s likely that we will hire Mary or Sue.
c. It’s certain that we will hire Mary or Sue.
(2) a. It’s possible that we will hire Mary.
b. It’s possible that we will hire Sue.
Part of the evidence for these effects is that all of (1a)-(1c) are infelicitous in a
context where one of (2a) or (2b) is false.
(3) I talked to the committee, it’s impossible that we will hire Mary but . . .
#It’s possible/likely/certain that we will hire Mary or Sue.
These observations generalize to epistemic modal expressions in different syntac-
tic categories, including adverbs like possibly, probably, certainly and auxiliaries
like might, should and must. They also arise with some modal expressions with
nonepistemic flavor — in particular, with deontic modal adjectives like allowed and
required, and with the corresponding auxiliaries may and have to.1 Some examples
are below in (4)–(7).
(4) It might rain or snow tomorrow.
a.  It might rain tomorrow
b.  It might snow tomorrow
(5) John must have taken Syntax or Logic last year.
a.  John might have taken Syntax last year
b.  John might have taken Logic last year
(6) It is allowed to smoke or drink in this room.
a.  It’s allowed to smoke in this room
b.  It’s allowed to drink in this room
(7) John has to take Syntax or Logic this year.
a.  John may take Syntax this year
1 Disjunction embedded under quantificational DPs like all students and some students also appears to
give rise to similar inferences (Klinedinst 2007, Fox 2007 among others):
(i) All students/Some students took Syntax or Logic this year.
a.  some student took Syntax
b.  some student took Logic
We focus on the case of modals in this paper and we leave to further work the task of investigating
extensions of our account to cases like those in (i). See also footnote 8 below, where we point to
arguments from Crnic et al. (2015), which call into question whether we should treat at least the case
of all in the same way.
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b.  John may take Logic this year
All these effects are unexpected from the viewpoint of classical modal semantics,
which descends from modal logic and treats natural language modals as quantifiers
over worlds. This analysis, in combination with the hypothesis that or simply cor-
responds to Boolean disjunction, predicts that the following inference patterns are
invalid:2
(p∨q) 6 ♦p∧♦q
♦(p∨q) 6 ♦p∧♦q
There is broad (though not universal) agreement that a Boolean analysis of disjunc-
tion (and classical modal semantics) are essentially correct, and that the scalar effects
we described should be captured as implicatures that arise on top of literal meaning
(Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, Simons 2005, Fox 2007, Klinedinst 2007, Chemla
2010, van Rooij 2010, Franke 2011, Alonso Ovalle 2005, Chierchia 2013, Crnic
et al. 2015).3 The main argument for this approach is that the problematic effects
disappear in downward entailing contexts — a signature of scalar implicatures in
general. For example, consider (8):
(8) It’s not possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
If the inferences in (2a) and (2b) arose also under negation, (8) would have the
meaning in (9a), represented schematically in (9b):
(9) a. It’s not true that: it’s possible that we will hire Mary or Sue and it’s
possible that we will hire Mary and it’s possible that we will hire Sue.
b. ¬[♦(p∨q)∧♦p∧♦q]
Notice that (9a) is compatible with it being possible that (say) we hire Mary. But
this is clearly incorrect. (8) says that it’s certain both that we will not hire Mary and
that we will not hire Sue. This shows that the inferences we’re interested in don’t
arise under negation.
To sum up: the scalar effects introduced above can be captured via a simple
generalization:
Possibility Implicatures of Modals (PIM)
Sentences of the form MOD[p∨q] (where ‘MOD’ stands for any modal
2 The same point holds for likely; see §2 for details.
3 For some semantic accounts of free choice inferences, see Higginbotham 1991, Zimmerman 2000,
Geurts 2005, Barker 2010, Starr 2016, among others. In this paper, we lack the space to set up a
comparison between our analysis and these accounts.
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that is not downward entailing in its prejacent position) give rise to
the inferences that each of the disjuncts is possible.
MOD[p∨q] ♦p, ♦q
Let us notice right away that PIM applies to modal expressions of various flavors and
syntactic categories. Throughout the core part of the paper, we focus on epistemic
modal adjectives. This choice is dictated by a practical concern: our proposal makes
crucial use of a degree semantics, and the most developed degree-based analyses of
modal terms concern just items of this sort. We are going to sketch how the proposal
may be extended to other items in §8.
1.2 The project: a uniform account
Strikingly, the great majority of analyses in the literature do not predict PIM via
a uniform mechanism.4 Instead, the scalar effects covered by PIM are generally
classified and treated differently. The effects triggered by non-existential modals
are sometimes called ‘distributive inferences’ — the intuition being that they ‘dis-
tribute’ the two propositions corresponding to each disjunct across the worlds in the
quantificational domain. These inferences can be handled straightforwardly by some
standard accounts of scalar implicature (e.g., Sauerland 2004 and Fox 2007). We go
through the details in §2, but the basic algorithm consists simply in conjoining the
basic meaning of the sentence with the negation of some of its stronger alternatives.
This strengthened meaning entails the relevant possibility claims. Schematically:
MODAL(p∨q)
⇓
MODAL(p∨q)∧¬MODAL(p)∧¬MODAL(q)
⇓
♦(p)∧♦(q)
The possibility inferences triggered by possibility modals, on the other hand, are
called ‘free choice inferences’ and are usually derived via a more complex route.
One increasingly popular account (though by no means the only live option) in-
4 Two notable exceptions to this are Chemla 2010 and Klinedinst 2007. Our proposal is in particular
very similar in spirit to that of Klinedinst (2007), although we do not make the assumptions that
modals quantify over pluralities of worlds. See §9.2 below for a brief comparison with Klinedinst’s
(2007) approach. We leave a detailed comparison with Chemla’s (2010) proposal for future research.
Notice also that Chierchia (2013) calls ‘free choice inferences’ both distributive and free choice
inferences, but derives them in very different ways.
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volves exploiting a recursive mechanism for computing implicatures (see Kratzer &
Shimoyama 2002, Fox 2007, Chierchia 2013 among others).
In this paper, we show that, by adopting a degree semantics for epistemic modal
expressions, we can derive all the effects covered by PIM, in a uniform way, via
the simple schematic process outlined above. The idea builds on recent work on
the semantics of epistemic modals. Recent literature on modality has defended the
claim that a degree semantics for modals might be empirically and theoretically
superior to a classical quantificational semantics (Swanson 2006 and Lassiter 2011;
see also Swanson 2015, Yalcin 2007, 2010, Lassiter 2014, Moss 2015a for related
work). On one popular implementation, epistemic modals work as measures of
probability, mapping propositions to a value on a probability scale. For concreteness,
in this paper we adopt a probabilistic semantics for modals, though in principle other
implementations of a degree semantics are possible. As mentioned, we focus on
epistemic modal adjectives like possible, likely and certain as our main case study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we set up some background
on the semantics of modals and scalar implicature. In §3, we show how this account
can straightforwardly derive distributive inferences, but not free choice ones. After
a brief overview of the proposal in §4, in §5 we give some background on degree
semantics for adjectives in general, while in §6 we discuss in detail the case for a
degree semantics for epistemic adjectives. In §7, we put forward our unified account
of all possibility inferences and in §8 we show how it can be extended beyond
epistemic modals. In §9, we discuss other remaining issues and make some brief
comparison with alternative proposals.
2 General background
2.1 The classical semantics of modals and probability operators
The contemporary benchmark for the semantics of modality is set by Kratzer’s
analysis (1981, 1991, 2012; see also Portner 2009). In outline, Kratzer treats modals
as quantifiers over a contextually restricted domain of worlds. This domain of
quantification is determined via two contextually provided sets of propositions (more
precisely: functions from worlds to sets of propositions), which Kratzer calls modal
base and ordering source. The modal base is used to single out the domain of
quantification of the modal: worlds in the domain are all and only those that satisfy
all the propositions in the modal base. The ordering source is (simplifying somewhat)
used to induce an ordering on the worlds in this domain, singling out a set of ‘best’
worlds, along some relevant dimension.5 What properties of worlds matter for the
5 One standard way to extract an ordering  from a set of propositions S is straightforward (as pointed
out by Lewis 1981). We say that, for any two worlds w1, w2, w1  w2 iff, for any p ∈ S, if p(w2) = 1,
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ordering depends on the flavor of modality involved. In particular, Kratzer takes
epistemic modals to use an ordering that ranks worlds on the basis of how much they
conform to stereotypical assumptions.
Using ‘ f ’ and ‘g’ to pick out respectively the modal base and the ordering source,
an analysis of possible and certain, under this approach, is in (10) and (11).6
(10) [[possible φ ]]w, f ,g = ∃w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w)) s.t. [φ(w′)]
(11) [[certain φ ]]w, f ,g = ∀w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w)) [φ(w′)]
As Kratzer emphasizes, her view is well-equipped to handle graded modal ex-
pressions, i.e. modal expressions with intermediate force between possibility and
necessity. likely, in particular, is treated as follows: likely φ is true iff, for every
non-φ -world in the modal base, there is a φ -world in the modal base that is more
highly ranked. Formally:
(12) [[likely φ ]]w, f ,g = ∀w′ ∈ [[¬φ ]]w, f ,g∩ f (w) : ∃w′′ ∈ [[φ ]]w, f ,g∩ f (w) :
w′′ ≺g(w) w′
The analysis naturally generalizes to modal expressions in other syntactic categories,
as well as expressions of different strength, modulo changes in quantificational
force. Some examples of epistemically modalized expressions covered by Kratzer’s
analysis are modal auxiliaries like might, should, and must and adverbs like possibly,
probably, and certainly.
2.2 Scalar implicatures
Before discussing distributive and free choice inferences, it is helpful to introduce
scalar implicatures in general.
then p(w1) = 1. The set of ‘best’ worlds is the set of worlds such that there is no world that is better
than them; i.e., BEST = {w : ¬∃w′ : w′ ≺ w}. For simplicity, here we are assuming that deontic
modals satisfy the so-called limit assumption (Lewis 1973, Stalnaker 1984). The limit assumption
says that we can single out a set of ‘best’ worlds starting from any world in the modal base. Formally
(and following the formulation in Kaufmann & Kaufmann 2015):
A pair of a modal base f and an ordering source g satisfies the Limit Assumption
iff for all possible worlds w, for all v ∈⋂ f (w) there is a u ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w)) such
that ug(w) v
Where BESTg(w)( f (w)) is the subset of
⋂
f (w) such that for all its elements there isn’t a strictly
g(w)-better world in
⋂
f (w).
6 For simplicity, we treat adjectives as propositional operators. Nothing hinges on this assumption
though. See also Swanson 2015 for discussion.
6
Probability and implicatures
Grice (1975) first singled out implicatures as a category of interpretive effects
going beyond the basic literal meaning of a sentence. Scalar implicatures are a
subkind of implicatures. Roughly, scalar implicatures involve the denial of a logically
stronger alternative to a sentence. Here is a classical example:
(13) a. We will hire Mary or Sue.
b.  We won’t hire both Mary and Sue
Grice treated all implicatures as purely pragmatic in nature. On his view, implicatures
are produced via general principles of reasoning, which take as input the final
result of the compositional computation of semantic value. Much recent work has
questioned this account. On the alternative view, scalar implicatures are generated by
semantic processes, i.e. processes that are implemented compositionally. The debate
is far from being settled and we will not enter this discussion here. As we point
out below, however, we need a view that allows scalar implicatures to arise from
embedded positions. More precisely, we need a theory that allows for ‘intermediate’
scalar implicatures, in the sense of Sauerland (2012, 2014). A natural way to do
this is to adopt a semantic view of scalar implicatures (Chierchia et al. 2012, Fox
2007, Chierchia 2013 a.o.), though any theory that allows for intermediate scalar
implicatures would work for our purposes.
Chierchia et al. (2012) suggest that scalar implicatures are generated by a silent
operator, which they represent as ‘EXH’ (for ‘exhaustification’). EXH is roughly
akin in meaning to natural language only. Like only, EXH combines with a sentence
φ and it returns the proposition resulting from conjoining the meaning of φ with
the negation of some of the alternatives of φ , ALT(φ ) — what we call excludable
alternatives. Schematically:
(14) [[exh]](φ)(w) = φ(w)∧ ∀ψ ∈ EXCL(φ ,ALT (φ))[¬ψ(w)]
We take an alternative to be excludable just in case (a) negating it doesn’t contradict
the literal meaning of the sentence asserted, and (b) negating it doesn’t force us to
accept other alternatives on the list (Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007; see also Gazdar
1979). Here is the formal definition.7
(15) EXCL(φ ,X) ={
ψ ∈ X : φ * ψ ∧¬∃χ[χ ∈ X ∧ (φ ∧¬ψ)⊆ χ]}
The idea behind the functioning of EXH is this: we try to strengthen the sentence as
much as possible, while at the same time avoiding both contradictions and arbitrary
choices. Here is a simple example: the sentence in (13a) has the alternatives in (16).
7 This algorithm is called ‘innocent exclusion’ in Fox 2007. (15) is not the final version of innocent
exclusion used by Fox, but it is enough for our purposes. For discussion see Fox 2007.
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(16)

We will hire Mary or Sue Mary∨Sue
We will hire Mary Mary
We will hire Sue Sue
We will hire Mary and Sue Mary∧Sue

Of these alternatives, only the conjunctive one (Mary∧Sue) is excludable. As for
the other two: if we excluded both, we would get a contradictory meaning (since,
combining the implicatures with the assertion, we would have that we will hire one
between Mary and Sue, but not Mary, and not Sue); if we excluded one, we would
have to arbitrarily select one of the two disjuncts as the true one (e.g., if we ruled We
will hire Mary as false, given the content of (13a) we would have to conclude that
We will hire Sue is true). Hence only the conjunctive alternative is ruled out, and the
strengthened meaning of the sentence is:
(17) We will hire Mary or Sue and it’s not true that we will hire both.
The kind of strengthening induced by EXH is generally called exhaustification, and
sentences that have gained a stronger meaning in this way are called exhaustified.
So far, we haven’t said what sentences enter the set of alternatives used to
compute exhaustified meanings. This is a controversial issue in the literature, and
one that cross-cuts the line between pragmatic accounts and semantic ones. This issue
doesn’t matter much for our purposes. For concreteness, we assume the complexity-
based account given by Katzir 2007 and Fox & Katzir 2011. In outline, on this
account the alternatives to S are those sentences that are no more complex than S,
and that can be obtained from S by replacing S’s constituents with its subconstituents
or relevant items from the lexicon.
3 Deriving distributive inferences (but not free choice ones)
3.1 Distributive inferences with certain and likely
We can now go back to sentences like (18a) and (18b) and show how we can derive
the distributive inferences in (19a) and (19b) as straightforward scalar implicatures.
(18) a. It is certain that we will hire Mary or Sue.
b. It is likely that we will hire Mary or Sue.
(19) a.  It is possible that we will hire Mary
b.  It is possible that we will hire Sue
Consider first (18a); its alternatives are in (20). All of the alternatives in (20) (aside
from the one corresponding to the assertion) are excludable: they are all stronger
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than the basic meaning of (18a), and there is no alternative such that negating it
compels us to accept another alternative.
(20)

It is certain that we will hire Mary or Sue (Mary∨Sue)
It is certain that we will hire Mary (Mary)
It is certain that we will hire Sue (Sue)
It is certain tha twe will hire Mary or Sue (Mary∧Sue)

By conjoining the basic meaning with the negated excludable alternatives, we
obtain the distributive inferences that we are looking for, since (21) entails (22).
(Here and in what follows, to avoid clutter we ignore the conjunctive alternative,
which is superfluous since its negation is entailed by the negation of the other two
alternatives).8
(21) (Mary∨Sue)∧¬(Mary)∧¬(Sue)
(22) (Mary∨Sue)∧♦(Mary)∧♦(Sue)
This can easily extend to the case of likely in (18b), the alternatives of which are
in (23). To our knowledge, the scalar inferences triggered by likely have not been
discussed in the literature. But, as the reader can check, by adopting the meaning in
(12) and conjoining the sentence with negated excludable alternatives, as in (24), we
predict the distributive effect (since (24) entails (25)).9
8 As mentioned above, this account of distributive inferences is generally applied also to the parallel
inferences of disjunction embedded in the scope of a universal quantifier like (i).
(i) Every student took Syntax or Logic
a.  some student took Syntax
b.  some student took Logic
Again, the inferences in (ia) and (ib) can be obtained by negating the alternative corresponding to
each disjunct embedded under the universal quantifier: every student took Syntax and every student
took Logic.
Crnic et al. 2015, however, show that this derivation is problematic. In particular, they show that
a sentence like (i) can be interpreted as giving rise to the distributive inferences even in contexts in
which one of the two alternatives mentioned above is actually true (e.g., a context in which every
student took Syntax). They then propose a different way of deriving distributive inferences, involving
two exhaustifications and a stipulation about alternatives. Crucially, as they notice, the problem they
identify does not extend to the case of modals.
9 Notice that a scalar implicature account of these inferences can also naturally account for why they
tend to be absent in downward entailing contexts, given that this is a general property of scalar
implicatures. One way to capture this property is assuming that the distribution of EXH obeys an
economy condition along the lines of (i): that is, it is not added if it leads to an overall weaker meaning
(this condition is a version of the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis; see Chierchia et al. 2012 among
others for discussion).
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(23)

It is likely that we will hire Mary or Sue
a
(Mary∨Sue)
It is likely that we will hire Mary
a
(Mary)
It is likely that we will hire Sue
a
(Sue)
It is likely that we will hire Mary and Sue
a
(Mary∧Sue)

(24)
a
(Mary∨Sue)∧¬a(Mary)∧¬a(Sue)
(25)
a
(Mary∨Sue)∧♦(Mary)∧♦(Sue)
In sum: we can derive the distributive inferences triggered by certain and likely in a
straightforward way by adopting a standard account of scalar implicature.
Before moving on, let us notice a potential problem concerning the effects
triggered by likely. The account predicts that, whenever likely (φ ∨ψ) triggers
possibility inferences, it will also trigger the inference that likely φ and likely ψ
are false. In fact, the derivation of the former inferences essentially relies on the
latter. This may be problematic. Several reviewers have pointed out to us that they
can distinguish an intermediate reading of likely (φ ∨ψ) that triggers the relevant
possibility inferences, but not the inferences that likely φ and likely ψ are false. Here
is an example.10 Suppose that I have removed some cards from a standard 52 card
deck, and I ask you to draw a card at random. I add:
(26) It is likely that you will draw a spade or a number.
(26) clearly triggers the inference in (27):
(27) a.  It is possible that you will draw a spade
b.  It is possible that you will draw a number
While the judgment is subtle, it does not seem to trigger those in (28):
(28) a.  It is not likely that you will draw a spade
b.  It is not likely that you will draw a number
If this judgment is correct, this is an obvious problem for either standard theories of
likely, or standard theories of distributive implicatures. One of the advantages we are
going to claim for our proposal is that it improves on this prediction.11
(i) Do not weaken!: Do not insert EXH in S if the overall resulting meaning is weaker than
[[S]].
10 This example is a refinement of one suggested by an anonymous referee.
11 A referee and the editor point out an additional issue, distinct from the availability of what we’ve
called ‘intermediate reading’. They suggest that a sentence corresponding to the strengthened meaning
sounds quasi-contradictory. Compare (i) to (ii), which involves certain and is unproblematic.
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3.2 The trouble with possible
Given that the account of distributive inferences sketched above covers both certain
and likely, one might expect that it also covers the free choice inferences generated
under possible. But this is not so if we stick to the classical semantics for possible.
Consider the counterpart of (18a) and (18b) involving possible. This sentence
triggers the usual inferences in (29a) and (29b).
(29) It is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
a.  It is possible that we will hire Mary
b.  It is possible that we will hire Sue
Suppose we try to derive the free choice effect as a kind of implicature in the way
we did above. Our alternatives are:
(30)

It is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue ♦(Mary∨Sue)
It is possible that we will hire Mary ♦(Mary)
It is possible that we will hire Sue ♦(Sue)
It is possible that we will hire Mary and Sue ♦(Mary∧Sue)

Here we get stuck. Differently from previous cases, the first two alternatives are not
excludable, hence we cannot strengthen the assertion with their denial. If we deny
♦(Mary), given the content of the assertion (i.e. ♦(Mary∨Sue)), ♦(Sue) must be
true. Vice versa if we deny ♦(Sue). So the derivation of (29a) and (29b) is blocked.12
(i) ?It’s likely that we will hire Mary or Sue and it’s not likely that we will hire Mary and it’s
not likely that we will hire Sue.
(ii) It’s certain that we will hire Mary or Sue and it’s not certain that we will hire Mary and it’s
not certain that we will hire Sue.
We think the source of this contrast lies in the fact that likely, but not certain, is a neg-raising predicate
(see Horn 1978, Gajewski 2007, Romoli 2013). This means that (i) is typically interpreted as in (iii).
While (iii) is consistent, it is intuitively not easy to think of a situation that would make it true and
this could be the reason why the sentence sounds slightly deviant.
(iii) ?It’s likely that we will hire Mary or Sue and it’s likely that we will not hire Mary and it’s
likely that we will not hire Sue.
12 To be sure, we still derive the implicature that it might not be that we hire both Mary and Sue, via the
conjunctive alternative. But this is not enough to get the free choice effect: from ¬♦(Mary∧Sue) it
doesn’t follow that ♦(Mary) or ♦(Sue).
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4 Overview of the proposal
One might wonder whether there is something wrong with our assumptions. Through-
out §3, we presented a general kind of scalar reasoning that allowed us to derive
distributivity implicatures under certain and likely. Why should that reasoning fail
just for possible?
Why, indeed? In the next sections, we show that the simple scalar reasoning that
we use to derive distributive inferences also gets us free choice, provided that we
tweak the meaning of possible. On a standard, Kratzer-style semantics, possible is an
existential quantifier. Among other things, this means that possible works as a scalar
endpoint: possible is the weakest quantifier over epistemically possible worlds. As
a result, when we deny possible φ we obtain a very strong claim, i.e. the claim
that there are no φ -worlds. We suggest that we remedy the problem by introducing
more structure into the semantics of possible. In particular, a degree-based treatment
makes a difference to the alternatives generated by possible-sentences.
The next sections develop the proposal in detail, but here we give an overview.
Following standard theories of gradable adjectives, we assume that likely, certain
and possible work as measure functions. In particular, they all map propositions to
sets of degrees of probability. For example, this is the schematic meaning for likely
φ :
(31) [[likely φ ]] = λd. Pr([[φ ]])≥ d
In addition, we are going to assume that gradable adjectives in the positive form
combine with a covert morpheme, dubbed ‘POS’. Roughly, POS sets a standard on
the scale that the adjective operates on.
For the case of likely, this standard is merely a degree of probability that is salient
in the context. Hence It is likely that φ is true just in case the probability of φ is
greater than the contextual standard for likelihood (which we denote as ‘slikely’).
(32) [[It is pos likely that φ ]] = 1 iff Pr([[φ ]])> slikely
For the case of possible, we assume that the standard is the minumum of the scale.
As a result, It is possible that φ is true just in case there is some non-zero degree of
probability such that the probability of φ is greater than that.13
(33) [[It is pos possible that φ ]] = 1 iff there is a d > 0 such that Pr([[φ ]])≥ d
Our key observation is that we can derive possibility implicatures for all relevant
cases by giving the exhaustivity operator intermediate scope between POS and the
13 For some early predecessors of this semantics for possible, see Yalcin 2005, Lassiter 2010, as well as
the close account in Swanson 2006.
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adjective. I.e., adopting a degree semantics for modal adjectives, the following
configuration yields free choice:
(34) POS [EXH [MODAL (p∨q)]]
For a schematic example, consider:
(35) [[pos [exh [possible (p∨q)]]]] = there is a d such that d > 0 and Pr(p∨q)
≥ d and Pr(p) < d and Pr(q)< d
Informally, here is how we derive free choice from (35): if the probability of a
disjunction is at least some degree d, and the probability of each disjunct is lower
than d, then each disjunct must have positive probability. Given the meaning we’re
assuming for possible, this is equivalent to the claim that each disjunct is possible.
The next three sections develop and defend the proposal in detail.
5 Background on degree semantics
5.1 Degrees, gradability, and scalarity
Let us start by clarifying what we mean by ‘degree semantics.’ We take a degree
semantics for a category of lexical items I to be a semantics that represents the
meanings of expressions in I by appealing to degrees, i.e. abstract entities that form
a dense linear ordering, where the order is determined by a dimension (e.g., height,
weight, length, etc). Following the custom, we call the orderings of degrees ‘scales.’
On each of its two ends, a degree scale can be closed (when there is a first or
a last degree on the scale) or open (when neither of the two previous conditions is
met); see Kennedy & McNally 2005 for discussion. Different lexical items exploit
different kinds of scales. In diagram form:
TOTALLY OPEN
LOWER CLOSED
UPPER CLOSED
TOTALLY CLOSED
Items that have a degree semantics are generally gradable, i.e. they can be
combined with a range of modifiers. Semantically, modifiers manipulate a degree
threshold on the scale used by the adjective. The standard examples of gradable
items are gradable adjectives, like tall, open, and full.
(36) Mary is very tall.
(37) The door is slightly open.
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(38) The jar is almost full.
The scale type associated with an adjective correlates with the availability or lack of
availability of certain modifiers. For example, proportional modifiers like partially,
half, or 60% may only combine with closed scale adjectives, as (39) and (40) show.
(39) #John is partially/half/60% tall.
(40) The jar is partially/half/60% full.
For a comprehensive survey of the relationship between modifiers and scale structure,
we refer the reader to Kennedy & McNally 2005 and Kennedy 2007.
5.2 Semantics of gradable adjectives: degrees and POS
We assume a semantics for gradable adjectives in the style of Cresswell 1976, von
Stechow 1984, Heim 1985, 2000 (among others). On this semantics, gradable adjec-
tives denote functions from degrees and individuals to truth-values (type 〈d,et〉).14
As an example, here is the lexical entry for tall.15
(41) [[tall]] = λd. λx. [HEIGHT(x)≥ d]
Informally, tall maps an individual and a degree to true just in case the individual’s
degree of height is equal to or greater than that degree.
Following the literature, we assume that the degree argument of the adjective
is provided by a separate morpheme, which appears in a syntactic position labeled
‘Deg(ree)P(hrase).’ When the adjective appears in the positive form, we assume the
presence of a covert morpheme ‘POS’ (for ‘positive form’), which relates the degree
argument of the adjective to a salient standard of comparison.
Following Heim 2000, we assume that all degree phrases, including POS, are of
type 〈dt, t〉 and that syntactically they are generated as a sister of the adjective. This
produces a type mismatch with adjectives (which are of type 〈d,et〉). As a result,
DegP moves leaving a trace of type d and combines with the rest of the sentence
14 These functions are monotonic with respect to their degree argument, in the sense that, given a choice
of e-type argument, if they yield truth when applied to a degree, they also yield truth when applied to
all degrees that are lower on the scale. Formally (see also Heim 2000):
(i) f〈d,et〉 is monotone iff ∀x∀d∀d′(if f (d)(x) = 1 and d′ < d, then f (d′)(x) = 1).
15 To remove clutter, we ignore index parameters wherever they’re not needed.
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after lambda abstraction.16 For illustration: the LF of the simple sentence in (42a)
after movement is in (42b).
(42) a. Mary is tall.
b. [DEGP POS] [ λd1 [DP Mary is [d1 tall ]]]
As Heim points out, DegP-movement has to be severely constrained. In particular,
it cannot outscope quantificational DPs and negation (Kennedy 1997, Heim 2000,
Beck 2012, Romero 2015 a.o.). To see this, notice that, if POS were allowed to scope
over the quantifier, as in (44), we would predict that (43) has the reading in (45)
(where stall represents the contextual standard for tallness).
(43) No student is tall.
(44) [DEGP POS] λd1 [[DP No student] is [AP d1 tall]]
(45) ∃d[d > stall ∧¬∃x[student(x)∧ tall(d)(x)]]
(45) says that there is a degree of height d above the standard of tallness such that no
student is d-tall. This requires merely that we can find a degree of height (say, 9 feet)
such that no student is tall to that degree. Obviously (43) does not have this reading.
From now on, we are going to assume that all syntactic constraints applying
to gradable adjectives in general will carry over to the case of epistemic modal
adjectives. We refer the reader to Heim’s paper for extended discussion of these
issues.
Let us say more about POS. Following Kennedy & McNally 2005, Kennedy
2007 (see also Bochnak 2015), we assume that the denotation of POS involves
a contextually provided function R, which restricts the possible denotations of d
depending on the clause that POS takes as one of its arguments.
(46) [[pos]] = λG〈d,t〉. ∃d[R(G)(d)∧G(d)]
As an example, the truth conditions for a sentence like Mary is tall are in (47), ‘stall’
indicates the standard of comparison for tall in the context.
(47) ∃d[R(λd′[tall(d′)(m)])(d)∧λd′[tall(d′)(m)](d) =
∃d[d > stall ∧ tall(d)(m)] =
∃d[d > stall ∧HEIGHT(m)≥ d]
The standard of comparison is fixed in different ways for different adjectives. Adjec-
tives that exploit a totally open scale, like tall, are evaluated relative to a contextually
16 For an alternative perspective on degree phrases that doesn’t use movement, see Alrenga & Kennedy
2014. We think our account could be made compatible with this alternative treatment, though we
don’t develop this variant here.
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given threshold (and are hence dubbed ‘relative standard adjectives’). Adjectives that
exploit closed scales are evaluated relative to the endpoints, and are hence dubbed
‘minimum standard’ or ‘maximum standards.’ Overall, the correlations between
scale structure are mapped in the following diagram:
SCALE TYPE ADJECTIVE TYPE EXAMPLE
open relative standard tall
lower closed minimum standard dirty
upper closed maximum standard safe
totally closed
minimum standard
maximum standard
min or max standard
open
closed
transparent
Notice that, for the case of adjectives exploiting totally closed scales, some adjectives
are ambiguous between a minimum and a maximum standard reading, while some
others invariably pick out one of the endpoints of the scale.
Discussing the correlation between scale structure and adjective type would take
us too far from our main target. So we are simply going to assume that R takes a
degree and an adjective and restricts the possible denotations of d on the adjective
scale in the following ways: R applied to a degree d and a 〈d, t〉 property involving
possible make sure that d is higher than the bottom of the scale (d > 0), in the case
of certain, d is restricted to be the maximum of the scale (d = 1), while with likely d
is restricted to be larger than a contextually salient degree (d > slikely).17
Presumably, these facts should be explained, but providing this explanation is
orthogonal to issues specific to modal adjectives.18
17 Something has to be said about how POS distinguishes between adjectives that use the same scale,
like possible, certain and likely. On the account we are assuming, these adjectives turn out to have
the very same lexical entry; hence the difference in truth conditions they produce has to be explained
via differences in the value of the R parameter. Crucially, this is not a problem arising specifically
with modal adjectives. Rather, it extends to all adjectives that exploit the same scale (e.g., hot and
warm) and is part of the general problem of correlating scale structures and adjective types.
18 So far as we know, the only attempt at providing a systematic account is due to Kennedy 2007, who
(building also on Kennedy & McNally 2005) hypothesizes that the correlations we described are
generated by a principle of ‘Interpretive Economy’, which roughly dictates using the endpoints of a
scale whenever they are available. We should note that even this account cannot explain in full the
range of variability observed for closed scale adjectives.
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6 Degree semantics for epistemic modal adjectives
This section states our analysis of the epistemic modal adjectives likely, certain and
possible. We start from a degree-based probabilistic semantics for likely (inspired by
Yalcin 2010 and Lassiter 2011, 2014) and extend it, with some changes, to certain
and possible. The idea of using a degree semantics for these modals is controversial,
so we will spend substantial space defending our assumptions.
6.1 Likely
6.1.1 The arguments for a degree semantics
Existing arguments for a degree semantics for epistemic modal adjectives fall into
two categories.19 The first concerns the logical properties of these adjectives; the
second concerns their ability to combine with scalar modifiers.
The item that has received greatest attention recently is likely.20 The Kratzer-
style semantics for likely in (12) predicts the validity of inference patterns that are
obviously incorrect. For example, it predicts the validity of the following:
(48) φ is as likely as ¬φ  φ is as likely as ψ
This is incorrect, since it entails that any proposition that is as likely as its negation
is at least as likely as any other proposition (and hence, that it has probability 1).
Conversely, a probabilistic semantics invalidates the problematic pattern.21
Arguments from compositional interactions focus on the fact that likely may
combine with degree modifiers and may appear in comparatives.
(49) It is very likely that Mary will hand in her paper in time.
(50) It is more likely that Mary gets an A than that Sue gets an A.
In addition, likely also appears in combination with certain proportional modifiers,
i.e. percentage modifiers of the form n%, as in (51):
19 For relevant work, see Swanson 2006, 2011, 2015, Yalcin 2007, 2010, 2012, Lassiter 2010, 2011,
2014, Moss 2015b,a. See also Cariani et al. 2016 for an up-to-date summary of the arguments for
a probabilistic semantics for likely. For concreteness, we are going to adopt as our benchmark the
approach in Yalcin 2010.
20 Arguments that the logical features of likely demand a probabilistic semantics are put forward by
Yalcin 2010 as well as Lassiter 2011, though the formal work that undergirds them precedes them
(see in particular Halpern 1997, 2003).
21 Holliday & Icard 2013 point out that there are semantics that are based on a qualitative ordering of
worlds (different from Kratzer’s) that manage to capture the logical desiderata laid out by Yalcin.
But these qualitative semantics suffer from other logical problems (as pointed out by Lassiter 2014;
see also the discussion in Cariani et al. 2016).
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(51) It is 20/50/80/100% likely that it will snow.
The presence of adjectival modifiers is standardly taken to be the hallmark of degree
semantics. In particular, the fact that likely can combine with proportional modifiers
as in (51) is evidence that the relevant scale is closed on both ends.
In sum, there appears to be a happy convergence between the two strands of
evidence for a semantics for likely that exploits degrees of probability. A probability
function maps each proposition in a given space to a real number lying in the
closed interval [0,1]. Hence a probability function can be characterized as a measure
function mapping propositions to a closed scale, exactly as the data about modifiers
suggests. Thus the logical and the compositional properties of likely seem to be
predicted, in one stroke, by a degree semantics based on probability.
We should note that, even if we accept a degree analysis, the claim that likely
invokes a probabilistic scale is not uncontroversial. In particular, Klecha (2014)
has argued that likely is gradable but exploits an open scale. Given that Klecha’s
semantics still retains some relevant logical properties22, the choice between Klecha’s
semantics and a probabilistic one is irrelevant for us. So we leave an evaluation
of Klecha’s proposal to other work. For concreteness (and because we think it
is eventually empirically superior), in this paper we are going to opt for a fully
probabilistic semantics.
6.1.2 Semantics for likely
We assume that the denotation of likely is analogous to the denotation of standard
gradable adjectives, modulo a different argument type (propositions rather than indi-
viduals), and a switch to a probability scale.23 Following the semantics for probably
in Yalcin 2010, we assume that semantic values are relativized to functions e from
worlds to probability spaces (besides being relativized to worlds, as is customary).
Probability spaces are pairs 〈E,Pr〉 of a set of possible worlds E and a probability
measure Pr. Officially, Pr takes as input subsets of E, but for simplicity we will
assume that Pr maps directly each world in E to a numerical value in the interval
22 In particular, that semantics still vindicates the following principle:
p is more likely than ⊥  (p∨q) is more likely than q (given that q 6 p)
23 A semantics that appeals to a notion of probability needs to explain how that notion is interpreted.
(For an overview of the options, see Hájek 2012). For current purposes, we simply assume that this is
a notion of subjective probability capturing the credences of the speaker. This assumption is simplistic
and runs into a series of problems (including the arguments from retractions and disagreements
put forward by MacFarlane 2011, and the puzzles generated by so-called epistemic contradictions
discussed by Yalcin 2007). But the point is orthogonal to our main concerns in this paper.
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[0,1] in accordance with the standard constraints on probability distributions.24
Below is our semantics for likely (type 〈d,〈st, t〉〉).
(52) [[likely d φ ]]w,e = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ :[[φ ]]w
′,e = 1}) ≥ d
(where Pre(w) is the function Pr in e(w))
For simplicity, we will use the simplified lexical entry in (53).
(53) [[likely]] = λd. λ p. [Pr(p)≥ d]
Differently from existing analyses of likely, we assume that the meaning of likely
does not involve the specification of a threshold on the scale. (This would make it
difficult to account for the compositional interactions of likely.) Rather, we assume
that, on a par with other gradable adjectives, the standard of comparison used by
likely is fixed by a DegP item, and in particular by POS for the positive form. So
the LF of (say) (54) is in (55), with POS moving out for the usual type-mismatch
reasons.
(54) It is likely that we will hire Mary.
(55) [DEGP POS ] [λd1 [it is [ d1 likely ] [that we will hire Mary]]]
As explained, we assume that the value slikely is simply a degree of probability that
stands out in the context.25
The truth conditions resulting from these assumptions appear adequate: a sen-
tence like (54) is true iff the probability that we will hire Mary is higher than the
contextual threshold for likely.
(56) [[(54)]] = 1 iff ∃d[d > slikely∧Pr([[we will hire Mary]])≥ d]
In the next subsection, we show how this analysis of likely can straightforwardly be
extended to certain.
24 Specifically, the constraints we need to impose are:
(a) Pr(E) = 1
(b) If p and q are disjoint sets of worlds, Pr(p∪q) = Pr(p)+Pr(q).
For simplicity, we also assume with Yalcin that the space of all possible worlds W is finite.
25 This choice departs from several existing semantics for likely (e.g., Yalcin’s official semantics in his
2010), which set this threshold at .5. But there is evidence that the threshold can be lower or higher
than this, depending on context, as discussed by Yalcin (2010) himself.
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6.2 Certain
It is uncontroversial that certain is gradable: it may appear in comparative construc-
tions, as in (57), and compose with degree modifiers, as in (58).
(57) It is more certain that we will hire Mary than that we will hire Sue.
(58) It is pretty certain that we will hire Mary.
We think there is good evidence that certain and likely work on scales that are
overlapping, if not identical. Here are three pieces of evidence for this claim. First,
It is certain that p works as a congruent answer to a question asking about the
probability of p.26
(59) a. A: How likely is it that we will hire Mary?
b. B: It is certain that we will hire Mary.
Second, certain entails likely.
(60) It is certain that we will hire Mary  It is likely that we will hire Mary.
Third, modified instances of likely may entail modified instances of certain. For
example, extremely likely seems to entail almost certain, as witnessed by the awk-
wardness of (62).
(61) It is extremely likely that we will hire Mary  It is almost certain that we
will hire Mary.
(62) ?? It is extremely likely, but not almost certain, that we will hire Mary.
These data motivate a degree semantics for certain that uses a scale that overlaps
with that of likely — hence, a probabilistic scale.27
Extending our probabilistic semantics to certain is easy. The entry (in (63),
simplified version in (64)), is analogous to that of likely. The only difference is that
the meaning of certain dictates that the maximum degree on the scale ‘stands out,’
in Kennedy’s sense.
(63) [[certain d φ ]]w,e = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ :[[φ ]]w
′,e = 1}) ≥ d
(where Pre(w) is the function Pr in e(w))
26 We learned of examples of this kind from Klecha 2014. (Klecha uses a variant of (59) to argue that
likely and must are not scalemates.)
27 This idea is not problem-free. In particular, Klecha points out some disanalogies between likely and
certain in comparative constructions and in certain downward entailing environment. We don’t have
the space to address these worries here.
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(64) [[certain]] = λd. λ p. [Pr(p)≥ d]
The resulting semantics yields adequate truth conditions for sentences involving
certain: the probability of the prejacent of certain is 1. That is, (65) is true iff the
probability that we will hire Mary is 1 (a very similar analysis is defended in Lassiter
2010, 2016 among others).
(65) It is certain that we will hire Mary.
(66) [[(65)]] = 1 iff ∃d[d = 1∧Pr([[we will hire Mary]])≥ d]
6.3 Possible
This section lays out our analysis of possible. From a formal point of view, this anal-
ysis is unproblematic and closely connected to our analysis of likely. But the analysis
is empirically controversial; in particular, Klecha 2014 has argued extensively that
possible is not gradable and that hence it doesn’t have a degree semantics. Here we
take up the empirical challenge. We are going to agree with Klecha that the evidence
presented so far in the literature is unsatisfactory, but we are going to produce new
data in favor of gradability from both English and Italian. We will conclude that a
gradable analysis is not problem-free, but it is our best bet.
6.3.1 Skepticism about gradability
We start from Lassiter’s (2010, 2011, 2016) defense of the idea that possible is
gradable. Lassiter treats possible as a minimum standard adjective exploiting a
closed scale. This places possible in a category of items that includes adjectives
like acquainted, protected, and documented (Kennedy & McNally 2005); though,
interestingly, Lassiter doesn’t draw a direct close comparison with adjectives in this
group. The data Lassiter uses to support this claim includes the following:
(67) It is slightly possible that the Jets will win. (Lassiter 2010)
(68) I felt that if it was 80-90 percent possible that [the cancer] hadn’t spread, I
didn’t want the hysterectomy. (Lassiter 2011; web data)
(69) In fact, it is more possible that tomorrow is the zombie apocalypse than
people magically floating away into the clouds. (Lassiter 2016; web data)
Lassiter’s empirical claims have been criticized from a number of directions. A
first, flat-footed challenge simply concerns sentences like (67)–(69). A number of
informants judge that these sentences are not fully felicitous. In addition, Klecha
(2014) provides both corpus and experimental evidence against Lassiter’s gradability
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claim. The experimental evidence is particularly significant for us: Klecha tests the
acceptability of possible in combination with a four modifiers — very, pretty, too,
and the comparative form (more than). The finding is that modification negatively
affects acceptability and it crucially does so for possible more than it does with
likely.
We agree that these are substantial challenges. But we think that an investigation
of other modifiers provides evidence that possible is gradable after all.
6.3.2 Evidence for the gradability of possible
To our knowledge, the debate about possible has focused on a relatively restricted set
of modifiers: very, slightly, comparatives like more than, and proportional modifiers
like 60%. But this choice seems arbitrary. We have independent knowledge that
some of these modifiers do not combine with closed scale adjectives. Conversely,
some modifiers that combine specifically with closed scale adjectives have so far
been ignored.
Kennedy & McNally (2005) discuss a class of minimum standard adjectives that
exploit a closed scale. This class includes the adjectives aware, able, acquainted,
documented, understood, publicized. Kennedy and McNally notice that the default
intensifier for these adjectives is well. Conversely, most of them may not combine
with slightly and very, as the following sentences show.
(70) ??John is slightly/very able to do his homework.
(71) ??Sara is slightly/very acquainted with this theory.
(72) ??The election is slightly/very documented/publicized.
On a probabilistic analysis, possible turns out to be exactly a minimum standard
adjective operating on a closed scale. As a result, we expect it to pattern with (70)–
(72). Hence it’s not surprising that slightly possible and very possible are awkward.
(Let us hasten to point out that the adjectives appearing in (70)–(72) do combine
with proportional modifiers, hence if we had a full analogy we would expect, say,
60% possible to be felicitous. More on this shortly.)
Conversely, we expect that possible combines with the kind of intensifiers that are
acceptable with the adjectives in (70)–(72). In the next paragraphs, we suggest that
this prediction is in part borne out, if we look at crosslinguistic data. In particular, we
claim that: (i) possible combines with modifiers that are clearly scalar in meaning,
and in fact select specifically for closed scales; (ii) the truth-conditional effects of
possible-modification involve shifting a threshold along a scale that interacts with
the scale used by likely. The emerging pattern of modification is still spotty, but on
balance supports a degree analysis for possible.
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The items we focus on are the Italian modifier ampiamente and the English
modifiers well and very well. We argue that, on the most natural analysis, these
modifiers work by shifting a degree parameter introduced by possible.
Italian ampiamente. Our first example is the Italian intensifier ampiamente (trans-
latable as ‘amply’). Ampiamente possibile is grammatical and intuitively conveys
that the relevant event is both possible and also somewhat likely.
(73) E’
is
ampiamente
amply
possibile
possible
che
that
Samanta
Samantha
verra’
come.FUT
alla
to.the
festa.
party
‘it is amply possible that Samantha will come to the party’
There is clear evidence that ampiamente is a genuine scalar modifier.28 In particular,
the licensing of ampiamente is sensitive to scale scructure: ampiamente is infelici-
tous when combined with adjectives that operate on an open scale (like alto/tall),
adjectives that operate on a lower-closed, upper-open scale (like bagnato/wet), and
adjectives that operate on a lower-open, upper-closed scale (like asciutto/dry).
(74) ??Samanta
Samantha
è
is
ampiamente
amply
alta
tall
(75) ??Il
The
tavolo
table
è
is
ampiamente
amply
bagnato
wet
(76) ??Il
The
bucato
laundry
è
is
ampiamente
amply
asciutto
dry
By contrast, ampiamente is felicitous with adjectives (and, in some cases, locutions)
that exploit fully closed scales. Below are some examples that directly translate the
items in Kennedy and McNally’s list.
28 The evidence that we present here sets ampiamente aside from catch-all modifiers like quite or the
italian suffix -issimo, which combine with virtually all scalar items:
(i) Sarah is quite tall.
(ii) The counter is quite wet.
(iii) The laundry is quite dry.
(See the discussion in chapter 5 of Klecha 2014, as well as Beltrama & Bochnak 2015). As several
researchers have pointed out, the fact that these modifiers are entirely insensitive to scale structure
suggests a different analysis, on which they do not operate on a scale at all. For example, Klecha
2014 treats quite as a quantifier over contexts; quite works as an intensifier because it quantifies over
a number of possible input values to the ‘standard’ parameter of POS.
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(77) L’esistenza
The.existence
di
of
una
a
corrispondenza
correspondence
fra
between
Churchill
Churchill
e
and
Mussolini
Mussolini
è
is
ampiamente
amply
documentata.
documented
(78) Questo
This
fenomeno
phenomenon
astronomico
astronomical
è
is
ampiamente
amply
compreso.
understood
(79) La
The
mostra
exhibition
è
is
ampiamente
amply
pubblicizzata.
advertised
(80) Le
The
autorità
authorities
sono
are
ampiamente
amply
a
acquainted
conoscenza
with.the
dei
facts
fatti.
This distributional pattern virtually coincides with the pattern of the English in-
tensifier well, studied by Kennedy & McNally 2005. The fact that its distribution
correlates with a certain kind of scale structure is a typical hallmark of degree
modifiers.
In addition, there is truth-conditional evidence that modification with ampiamente
has the effect of shifting a threshold on a degree scale that is at least overlapping with
that used by probabile (which translates likely). In particular, the use of ampiamente
possibile suggests that the degree of likelyhood of a proposition is not low. This is
showed by the contrast between (81) and (82).
(81) È
It.is
possibile,
possible,
ma
but
molto
very
improbabile,
unlikely,
che
that
i
the
Bulls
Bulls
arrivino
get
ai
to.the
playoffs
playoffs.
(82) ??È
It.is
ampiamente
amply
possibile,
possible,
ma
but
molto
very
improbabile,
unlikely,
che
that
i
the
Bulls
Bulls
arrivino
get
ai
to.the
playoffs
playoff
This contrast survives when possibile appears in combination with modifiers different
from ampiamente. For example, the following case shows that del tutto possibile
(which roughly translates entirely possible) is compatible with low probability of the
prejacent.
Scenario: Giovanni is fond of buying lottery tickets, despite the fact
that his chances of winning the lottery are very low. Maria is irritated
by this behavior and comments: “What an idiot! It’s obvious that he
will never win".
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In this scenario, (83) is a fine rebuttal to Maria, but (84) sounds contradictory.
(83) È
is
del tutto
entirely
possibile
possible
che
that
Giovanni
Giovanni
vinca,
win,
anche
even
se
though
è
is
molto
very
improbabile.
unlikely
‘It is entirely possible that Giovanni wins, even though it is very unlikely’
(84) # È
is
ampiamente
amply
possibile
possible
che
that
Giovanni
Giovanni
vinca,
win,
anche
even
se
though
è
is
molto
very
improbabile.
unlikely
‘It is amply possible that Giovanni wins, even though it is very unlikely’
Given these data, the natural suggestion is that ampiamente has a scalar meaning,
and that, on a par with modifiers like very, it works by shifting upwards a threshold
on a degree scale.
Back to English: well, scarcely and impossible. Can we find a counterpart of
Italian ampiamente in English? The natural candidate, especially given the pattern
individuated by Kennedy and McNally, is well itself. And indeed several of our
informants (in particular, native speakers of British English from some areas of
Northern England and Northern Ireland) find modifications of possible with well or
very well, as in (85), grammatical:
(85) It is (very) well possible that it will rain.
Moreover, well and very well are very commonly used to modify epistemic might:
(86) It might well be that it rains.
(87) Mary might very well bring her girlfriend to the party.
There are two other suggestive pieces of evidence that English possible has a scalar
semantics. The first is that possible combines, at least for some speakers, with
another modifier that selects for fully closed scales, namely scarcely.
(88) It is scarcely possible that Rubio will win at this point in the race.
The licensing pattern of scarcely follows closely that of well, and of ampiamente in
Italian. On the one hand, scarcely is infelicitous with all adjectives that don’t employ
a closed scale.
(89) ??Samantha is scarcely tall.
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(90) ??The table is scarcely wet/dry.
On the other, scarcely seem to be licensed with all the adjectives in the Kennedy and
McNally closed scale list.
(91) Homer’s life is scarcely documented.
(92) Earthquakes are still scarcely understood.
Therefore scarcely appears to be a genuine scalar minimizer which combines with
possible.29
Second, we observe that possible has a gradable antonym, which can be formed
by in- prefixation, namely impossible. Impossible picks out a maximum standard on
a scale, as the following data show:
(93) It is almost impossible that Rubio will win the nomination.
(94) It’s completely impossible that we will hire a semanticist this year.
On the plausible assumption that in- prefixation triggers polarity reversal, this sug-
gests that possible also has a scalar meaning.
Spotty gradability. In summary: possible may combine with genuine scalar mod-
ifiers and this modification has the truth-conditional effects we expect on a scalar
semantics. At the same time, possible is somewhat awkward with a number of other
modifiers, including comparatives and proportional modifiers. So there seems to be
gradability, although in an uncharacteristically spotty way.
We think that, in this predicament, the best solution is adopting a genuine degree
semantics. A semantics that is not based on degrees has two major disadvantages.
First, it must treat scalar modifiers like well and ampiamente as ambiguous. These
modifiers would have a scalar meaning, which would be the one used in compounds
with genuinely gradable adjectives like documented/documentato, and a nonscalar
one, which would be the one used in combination with possible. This is obviously a
stipulation. Second, it’s just unclear how a non-degree semantics can account for the
truth-conditional effects of modification by well and ampiamente. In particular, it’s
unclear how to account for the fact that well possible φ and ampiamente possibile φ
entail that φ is somewhat likely in any straightforward way.
Conversely, we think that a theory that treats possible as using degrees will have
the resources to explain the spotty pattern we observe. Here we tentatively follow
Lassiter 2016 in hypothesizing that there is a constraint dictating a preference for
relative standard adjectives over minimum standard adjectives, whenever the two
can be used to express the same meaning. On this view, more possible is blocked by
29 Although it should be noticed that scarcely can apply also to verbs, like in ‘John scarcely ran.’
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the competition with more likely; similarly 40/50/60% possible would be blocked by
40/50/60% likely.
Finally, let us flag another route that deserves investigation. We may revise
some of our background assumptions about scale structure. In particular, it might
be that the degree scale exploited by possible has a different structure from the one
we assume — for example, it might not be a total ordering. While this would be
incompatible with a fully probabilistic semantics, it would be in principle compatible
with our account of the scalar inferences triggered by possible. This said, for current
purposes we set this hypothesis aside and proceed with a probabilistic analysis.
6.3.3 Semantics for possible
We use the semantics in (95) (simplified version in (96)). In this analysis, possible,
exactly like likely and certain, has type 〈d,〈st, t〉〉. As usual, the only difference with
respect to likely and certain is that possible makes salient the lowest degree on the
probability scale. Composition with POS works in the usual way.
(95) [[possible d φ ]]w,e = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ :[[φ ]]w
′,e = 1}) ≥ d
(where Pre(w) is the function Pr in e(w))
(96) [[possible]] = λd. λ p. [Pr(p)≥ d]
As a result, a sentence like (97) has the truth-conditions in (98): it is true just in case
the probability of us hiring Mary is non-zero.
(97) It is possible that we will hire Mary.
(98) ∃d[d > 0∧Pr([[we will hire Mary]])≥ d]
6.4 Summary
We have argued that certain, likely and possible are gradable adjectives. We model
their semantics on the semantics of, respectively, maximum, relative and minumum
standard adjectives. They all operate on a closed scale, which is a probability scale.
We also assume that the positive form of likely, certain and possible involves a
covert morpheme POS, which sets the standard of comparison using either infor-
mation contained in lexical entries or (when the latter is not available) contextual
information.
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7 A unified account of possibility implicatures
In this section, we first show how our account replicates the results of the standard
analysis, straightforwardly predicting the distributive inferences triggered by likely
and certain. We then move on to show how, unlike the standard analysis, our account
naturally generalizes to the free choice inferences triggered by possible.
7.1 Possibility implicatures with likely and certain
To start, consider a sentence with likely whose prejacent includes a disjunction like
(99). Suppose that we exhaustify it as in (99), via an exhaustivity operator taking
scope over the whole sentence.
(99) It’s likely that we will hire Mary or Sue.
(100) EXH[POS [λd1 [it is [ d1 likely ] [that we will hire Mary]]]]
Assuming for concreteness that the standard of likely in the context is set to .5, the
alternatives to (100) are in (101).
(101)

It is POS likely that we’ll hire Mary or Sue ∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d]
It is POS likely that we’ll hire Mary ∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Mary)≥ d]
It is POS likely that we’ll hire Sue ∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Sue)≥ d]
It is POS likely that we’ll hire Mary and Sue ∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Mary∧Sue)≥ d]

It is easy to see that all the alternatives are excludable (e.g., the negation of it’s likely
that we will hire Mary does not entail that it’s likely that we will hire Sue). By adding
their negation to the sentence, we get (102).30
(102) It is likely that we will hire Mary or Sue and it is not likely that we will hire
Mary and it is not likely that we will hire Sue.
Given our semantics for likely, (102) is equivalent to the schematic (103), which we
can simplify as in (104).
(103) ∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d]∧¬∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Mary)≤ d]∧¬∃d[d >
.5∧Pr(Sue)≥ d]
(104) Pr(Mary∨Sue)> .5∧Pr(Mary)≤ .5∧Pr(Sue)≤ .5
From (104) we can infer that the probability that we will hire Mary is non-zero and
the probability that we will hire Sue is non-zero.
30 We are omitting the negation of the conjunctive alternative which is entailed by the negation of the
other two alternatives.
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(105) It is likely that we will hire Mary or Sue.
a.  The probability that we will hire Mary is non-zero
b.  The probability that we will hire Sue is non-zero
But now, recall out semantics for possible: possible φ is true iff there is a degree of
probability d such that the probability of φ is greater than d. This means that (105a)
and (105b) entail, respectively:
(106) a. It’s possible that we will hire Mary
b. It’s possible that we will hire Sue
Hence we predict that likely (φ ∨ψ) generates standard possibility implicatures.
The derivation that we just illustrated can be replicated straightforwardly when
we replace likely with other epistemic modal expressions. First, it can straightfor-
wardly be replicated with certain: by applying the derivation above we derive (107),
from which it follows again that the probability of each disjunct has to be non-zero,
and therefore that they have to be possible.
(107) Pr(Mary∨Sue) = 1∧Pr(Mary)< 1∧Pr(Sue)< 1
Second, it can be replicated when likely appears in combination with various modi-
fiers, as in the following cases.31
(108)
It is very likely that we will hire Mary or Sue
It is 60% likely that we will hire Mary or Sue
It is 8% likely that we will hire Mary or Sue
It is .00000001% likely that we will hire Mary or Sue
. . .
In all these cases, the only difference is the probability threshold that is involved in the
meaning of the relevant modal adjective. But this doesn’t affect the computation of
implicatures; hence, in all these cases, we are able to derive probabilistic inferences,
exactly as we did for likely. We leave it to the reader to work out the details.
7.2 Giving EXH intermediate scope
So far, we have showed how a degree semantics can mimic the predictions of
a Kratzer-style approach. Let us now start showing how we get divergences in
predictions. Recall the judgment we elicited at the end of §3: (26) seems to trigger
the inferences in (27), but not those in (28).
31 Here we make the (very natural) assumption that the semantic contribution of the modifiers is to shift
the threshold appearing in the entry of likely.
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(26) It is likely that you will draw a spade or a number.
(27) a.  It is possible that you will draw a spade
b.  It is possible that you will draw a number
(28) a.  It is not likely that you will draw a spade
b.  It is not likely that you will draw a number
Yet a Kratzer-style semantics, together with the view of implicature we’re adopting
throughout the paper, is unable to predict this. Conversely, we can predict this pattern
in the framework that we have developed. The key maneuver is letting EXH take
intermediate scope between POS and likely.
Suppose that, rather than parsing (99) as (100), we parse it as follows, letting
EXH take scope below the λ -abstractor over degrees:
(109) POS [λd1 [EXH [it is [ d1 likely ] [that we will hire Mary]]]]
Let us sketch the derivation. First, the alternatives that EXH uses are in (110) (ignoring
‘it is’ here). Notice that, since POS is not in the scope of EXH, the alternatives involve
a free variable d.32
(110)

d likely that we will hire Mary or Sue Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d
d likely that we will hire Mary Pr(Mary)≥ d
d likely that we will hire Sue Pr(Sue)≥ d
d likely that we will hire Mary and Sue Pr(Mary∧Sue)≥ d

Once more, all alternatives are excludable. The outcome of the computation is (111),
where d is a free variable at this stage of the derivation. Assuming again that the
relevant contextual standard is .5, the resulting truth conditions are in (112).
(111) Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d∧Pr(Mary)≤ d∧Pr(Sue)≤ d
(112) ∃d[d > .5∧Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d∧Pr(Mary)≤ d∧Pr(Sue)≤ d]
Notice that the truth conditions in (112) are crucially weaker than the ones we got by
letting EXH take wide scope (in (104)). The latter truth conditions ruled out that the
32 We are assuming that the value of the free variable d is fixed by the context at the relevant stage of
the computation and that, once fixed, it remains constant across alternatives.
One might worry about potentially considering more alternatives for the sentence in
(105) — schematically, all the ones meaning that Pr(p) > d′, for all degrees d′ such that d′ > d.
This is not a problem, however. Even if we allowed these alternatives, we would conclude that the
probability of p is greater than or equal to d but not equal to any d′ greater than d: that is, we would
conclude that the probability of p is exactly d (where d is above the standard for likely). See Fox &
Hackl 2007 for discussion of a similar situation with the (absence of) implicatures in sentences like
John weighs more that 120 pounds.
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probabilities of the individual disjuncts could be higher than the contextual threshold.
The truth conditions in (112), conversely, only require (i) that the disjunction Mary
∨ Sue has a degree of probability d higher than the contextual threshold for likely,
and (ii) that the probability of both individual disjuncts is lower than d. They leave
open that the probability of the individual disjuncts are intermediate between d and
the contextual standard, as in the following diagram:
slikely
M ∨ S
d
MS
Hence a degree semantics for likely manages to predict that likely (φ ∨ψ) triggers
possibility inferences without also triggering the inferences that likely φ and likely
ψ are false. The key assumption that we used to get this result is that POS can
outscope EXH. This same assumption will do substantial work in the derivation of
the possibility inferences of possible.33
7.3 Predicting free choice under possible
Let us start by showing that, by letting EXH take wide scope with respect to POS,
we run into the same problems as standard modal semantics. Consider (113), and
assume that it is parsed as in (114).
(113) It is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
(114) EXH[POS [λd1 [it is [ d1 possible ] [that we will hire Mary or Sue]]]]
Schematically, the alternatives to (114) are as in (115).
(115)

POS λd [d possible that we’ll hire Mary or Sue] ∃d[d > 0∧Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d]
POS λd [d possible that we’ll hire Mary] ∃d[d > 0∧Pr(Mary)≥ d]
POS λd [d possible that we’ll hire Sue] ∃d[d > 0∧Pr(Sue)≥ d]
POS λd [d possible that we’ll hire Mary and Sue] ∃d[d > 0∧Pr(Mary∧Sue)≥ d]

33 Notice that this assumption is in line with the syntactic constraints in §5. We noticed that, while there
are constraints on the movement of items in DegP position (which include POS), those constraints
are limited to certain categories of items, like DPs and negation. Moreover, even this relatively
uncontroversial assumption will turn unnecessary on slightly different accounts of local implicatures.
For example, a theory in the style of Chierchia 2004, on which exhaustified meaning are computed in
parallel with basic meanings and carried along with them in the compositional computation, we don’t
need any syntactic assumptions at all.
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It is easy to see that the alternatives involving the two disjuncts are not excludable.
If we negate (say) it’s POS possible that we’ll hire Mary, we would get that the
probability of us hiring Mary is zero, which in turn entails that it’s POS possible that
we’ll hire Sue is true. As a result, no possibility inferences are computed if we parse
the sentence as in (114).34
Now suppose that (113) is parsed as in (116), with POS taking scope over EXH.
The alternatives in this case are in (117).
(116) POS [λd1 [EXH [it is [ d1 possible ] [that we will hire Mary or Sue]]]]
(117)

it is d possible . . . Mary or Sue Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d]
it is d possible . . . Mary Pr(Mary)≥ d]
it is d possible . . . Sue Pr(Sue)≥ d]
it is d possible . . . Mary and Sue Pr(Mary∧Sue)≥ d]

Crucially, on the new meaning all the alternatives are excludable. To see this, notice
that the negation of Pr(Mary) ≥ d, i.e. Pr(Mary) < d, together with the content
of the assertion, i.e. Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d, does not entail that Pr(Sue)≥ d. So we
can proceed with exhaustification. Schematically, this is the strengthened meaning.
(Again, we omit the negation of the conjunctive alternative, since it is entailed by
the negation of the other two.)
(118) Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d∧Pr(Mary)< d∧Pr(Sue)< d
(118) is then fed to POS; the resulting meaning is in (119).
(119) [[pos [λd1 [exh [it is [ d1 possible ] [that we will hire Mary or Sue]]]]]] =
∃d[d > 0∧Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d∧Pr(Mary)< d∧Pr(Sue)< d]
(119) says that the probability of the disjunction is greater than d, and that the
probability of each of its disjuncts is less than or equal to d. It follows that the
probability of each disjunct must be greater than zero. In other words, (119) entails
(120):
(120) Pr(Mary)> 0 ∧ Pr(Sue)> 0
Notice the crucial assumption that allows us to infer the facts in (120): epistemic
possibility modals like possible do not denote scalar endpoints, as on their classical
meanings. Rather, they operate on a dense degree scale and say that the degree
attaching to their prejacent is greater than a certain threshold. This allows us to infer
that there is a positive degree attaching to each of the two disjuncts.
34 Though the conjunctive alternative is innocently excludable, so (113), on the parsing in (114), does
give rise to a run-of-the-mill scalar implicature that we will not hire both Mary and Sue.
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Given our semantics for possibility claims, the relevant possibility inferences
follow from (120):
(121) a.  It is possible that we will hire Mary
b.  It is possible that we will hire Sue
Hence we predict free choice, using exactly the same mechanics we used to predict
other possibility inferences.
8 Extending the account
8.1 Extension to epistemic modals in other syntactic categories
Given the degree semantics adopted above, we can account for all the possibility
inferences generated by epistemic modal adjectives (recapitulated below) via a
uniform mechanism.
(122) a. It’s possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
b. It’s likely that we will hire Mary or Sue.
c. It’s certain that we will hire Mary or Sue.
(123) a.  It’s possible that we will hire Mary
b.  It’s possible that we will hire Sue
We have illustrated our analysis using the epistemic modal adjectives possible, likely
and certain. But, in principle, what we say can be generalized to modals in other
syntactic categories — including modal auxiliaries like might, should and must. For
instance, we may adopt a semantics for might that is exactly analogous to that of
possible, with a degree variable, which is then existentially quantified over.
(124) [[might d φ ]]w,e = 1 iff Pre(w)({w′ :[[φ ]]w
′,e = 1}) ≥ d
Whether we can run the same account of possibility implicatures will depend on
the compositional details. In particular, it will depend on whether we can composi-
tionally separate the degree element from the position in which existential closure
would happen, and insert an exhaustivity operator in between. In part, this question
depends on whether modal auxiliaries should be treated as gradable. Pursuing this
question in full is beyond the scope of this paper. Let us just notice again that, at first
sight, epistemic modal auxiliaries are perfectly felicitous when modified by well and
very well.
(125) It might very well be that we will hire Sue.
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8.2 Extension to deontic modals
So far, we have focused on free choice inferences arising from epistemic modals.
But possibility inferences are generated also by other modals, in particular deontic
modals — in fact, the problem of free choice was first pointed out just in connection
with the latter (von Wright 1968, Kamp 1973). Below are some examples (see also
(6) and (7) in §1).
(126) You are allowed to take Syntax or Logic.
a.  You are allowed to take Syntax
b.  You are allowed to take Logic
(127) You are required to take Syntax or Logic.
a.  You are allowed to take Syntax
b.  You are allowed to take Logic
The argument that we’re running in this paper is, in part, an argument from generality:
our account deserves consideration because it is able to predict the full array of data
in a unified way. So it’s important that we manage to extend the account to deontic
modals as well. Can we do this?
From a technical point of view, there is no difficulty. We can simply treat allowed,
required, and the like as degree expressions, mapping propositions to a degree scale
that has the same formal properties as a probability scale. This will allow us to derive
probability inferences via exhaustification exactly as in the case of epistemic modals.
At the same time, even granting that deontic modals have a degree semantics, it’s
unclear that the scale that they exploit has the right formal properties.
To illustrate the problem, take a naïve idea: deontic modal expressions map
propositions to a scale of permissibility (set aside, for the moment, exactly what this
notion of permissibility amounts to). At an intuitive level, it doesn’t seem that the
degree of permissibility of a disjunction like (126) is greater than or equal to the
degree of permissibility of one of its disjuncts, like (126a) and (126b).35 In fact, it’s
not even clear what could be meant by saying that a disjunction is ‘more permissible’
than its disjuncts. Yet this property is exactly what we need to derive possibility
inferences via exhaustification.36
In this section, we discuss the prospects for formulating a degree semantics of
the right kind for deontic modals. Given that our main focus is elsewhere, our dis-
cussion will have two significant limits. First, we won’t be able to present empirical
evidence in support of a degree semantics for these modals. For evidence of this
35 Thanks to Paul Portner (p.c.) for suggesting to us this way of putting the point.
36 In general, this property is a kind of additivity property. Probability measures satisfy a finite additivity
property, but even a weaker additivity property will do; for discussion, see Holliday & Icard 2013.
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sort (including the observation that the deontic modal auxiliary should can appear
in the comparative) see, among others, Portner & Rubinstein 2016. Second, since
there is no ready-made semantics we can use, our proposal will be just an outline.
Nevertheless, what we say should be enough to show that there are good prospects
for generalizing our account to the deontic case.
8.2.1 Deontic modals as measures of expected utility?
One natural attempt at a degree semantics for deontic modals exploits a scale of
expected utility.37 Roughly, expected utility is a measure of how valuable a certain
proposition is for an agent, given what else they know about the world. And in
fact expected utility semantics has been associated to deontic modals (see Goble
1996 and Lassiter 2011; see also Aloni 2005 for related work on imperatives). But
this kind of semantics, at least without substantial tweaks, is a nonstarter for our
purposes. Let us explain why.
The expected utility (henceforth, EU) of a proposition for an agent is defined
on the basis of their credence function (represented, as usual, as an assignment of
probabilities to propositions) and their utility function. Roughly, you can think of
utility as a measure of how valuable for the agent a certain state of the world is.
Since we won’t be using EU in our positive proposal for deontic modals, we are not
going to define explicitly EU here; rather, we refer the reader to any of the classical
discussions or overviews.38 Any mainstream way of defining EU will do for our
purposes. What matters to us is that (as we’re going to point out) EU accounts yield
predictions that are problematic for a theory of the scalar features of modals.
Let us sketch two EU-based semantics for deontic modals. We are going to
use required as our sample item. Since this example just serves the purposes of
illustrating the problem for EU theories, we won’t be concerned with the distinction
between weak and strong necessity modals.39
37 In a sense, any semantics for deontic modals that exploits a notion of comparative closeness (starting
from Lewis’s semantics in Lewis 1973) counts as a degree semantics. But here we intend to pick out
degree semantics that have a kind of quantitative structure, going beyond orderings.
38 For a classical account of expected utility theory, see Jeffrey 1983; for a more recent and very popular
version of decision theory see Joyce 1999. See Briggs 2015 for a recent overview.
39 As a reminder: it is widely acknowledged (see e.g., von Fintel & Iatridou 2008) that some deontic
modals are stronger than others. For example, required and have to (which are so-called strong
necessity modals) are stronger than ought (a so-called weak necessity modal). The following constrast
illustrates the difference.
(i) You ought to wash the dishes. In fact you’re required to do so/you have to.
(ii) #You’re required to/you have to wash the dishes. In fact, you ought to do so.
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In its general form, an EU semantics for required analyzes required φ as saying
that the EU of φ is higher than a certain threshold value. Formally (and introducing
a utility function parameter u besides familiar ones):
(128) [[required φ ]]w,e,u = 1 iff EUe(w),u(w)({w′ : [[φ ]]w′,e,u = 1})> tALT
tALT is a ‘threshold’ value that is set in relation to a set of alternatives specifying
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive courses of action. Different analyses
diverge on what alternatives should be used. One simple option is that the only
relevant alternative is the negation of the prejacent (as in the first account in Goble
1996; a similar idea, though not in the context of an EU semantics, is used by Jackson
1985, Jackson & Pargetter 1986). On this account, the schematic analysis in (128)
becomes:
(129) [[required φ ]]w,e,u = 1 iff EUe(w),u(w)({w′ : [[φ ]]w′,e,u = 1})>
EUe(w),u(w)({w′ : [[¬φ ]]w′,e,u = 1})
I.e., required φ is true iff the expected utility of φ is greater than the expected utility
of ¬φ . A second option is to take the relevant alternatives to be a contextually
supplied set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions, which specify
alternatives courses of action (as in the second proposal in Goble 1996, and in the
vicinity of the proposal in Lassiter 2011). On this proposal, (128) is specified as:
(130) [[required φ ]]w,e,u = 1 iff {w : [[φ ]]w,e = 1} =
⋃
BESTEUe(w),u(w)(ALT )
(where BESTEUe(w),u(w)(ALT ) is the set of members of ALT that maximize
expected utility, relative to e(w) and u(w))
Informally: required φ is true iff φ coincides with the union of the alternatives that
maximize expected utility. The choice between different versions of (128) doesn’t
matter for our purposes, so we don’t pursue the issue further.
Expected utility accounts of deontic modality (henceforth, “EU accounts") have
much to recommend them. But they also have drawbacks, some of which have been
pointed out in existing literature (see e.g., Cariani 2016a, 2016b). For reasons of
space, here we limit ourselves to pointing out two problems that relate closely to the
scalar properties of modals.
The first problem is very simple and very general. The problem is that EU
accounts yield systematically wrong predictions when deontic modals appear em-
bedded in DE environment. (131) entails the claims in (131a) and (131b):40
40 See also von Fintel 2012 for discussion and see Cariani 2013 for an alleged counterexample. While
we feel the pull of Cariani’s example, we hasten to point out that isolated counterexamples to the
entailment we discuss can be easily accommodate via embedded implicatures. The key point is that
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(131) Sally is not required to discuss her paper with John or Mary.
a.  Sally is not required to discuss her paper with John
b.  Sally is not required to discuss her paper with Mary
To better see the empirical point, notice that (132) sounds inconsistent.
(132) #Sally is not required to discuss her paper with John or Mary. But she is
required to discuss it with Mary.
These facts are fully expected on classical analyses for required. These analyses
are upward monotonic in the prejacent position, and hence validate the entailment
required φ  required (φ or ψ). Since downward entailing contexts reverse the
direction of entailment, these analyses predict that (131) entails (131a) and (131b).
But all versions of (128) are nonmonotonic, and hence fail to validate the relevant
entailment. As a result, EU accounts miss the entailment in (131), and predict that
the discourse in (132) is consistent.
The second problem is less general — since it presupposes a Sauerland/Fox-
style account of distributivity inferences — but still substantial. We saw that, on
EU accounts, required φ is not in general stronger than required (φ or ψ). This is
sometimes claimed to be an advantage of EU accounts (e.g., by Lassiter 2011).41 But
it creates problems for the computation of implicatures, since it blocks the derivation
of the distributive inferences in (127a) and (127b).
(127) You are required to take Syntax or Logic .
a.  You are allowed to take Syntax
b.  You are allowed to take Logic
Recall: the inferences in (127) are derived by (i) assuming that (133a) and (133b)
(below) express stronger propositions than (127), and (ii) assuming that implicatures
are computed via exhaustification of stronger alternatives that are excludable.
(133) a. You are required to take Syntax
b. You are required to take Logic
EU accounts predicts that entailments like that in (131) should fail systematically, since the semantics
of required is nonmonotonic. We think that the overall data clearly speaks against this prediction.
41 One of the reasons is that it blocks problematic-sounding inferences like the one from (i)-a to (i)-b,
which are validated by quantificational semantics. (This is known in classical literature as ‘Ross’s
puzzle,’ after Ross 1941.)
(i) a. You are required to post this letter.
b. You are required to post this letter or burn it.
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On EU accounts, the computation stops because step (i) is blocked. On the one
hand, this seems a drawback of EU accounts. On the other, it makes these accounts
look like nonstarters for our purposes. If it can’t get us even standard distributivity
inferences, a fortiori this analysis won’t get us free choice.
8.2.2 A probabilistic semantics for deontic modals
We suggest a minimal variant of classical ordering semantics for deontic modals. (See
Kratzer 1986, Kratzer 2012, as well as Lewis 1973.) Recall a schematic Kratzer-style
analysis of deontic required:
(134) [[required φ ]]w, f ,g = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w)), φ is true at w′
We suggest that we move to a degree semantics simply by replacing the quantifica-
tional element of (134) with a mapping to a probability scale. According to (134),
required φ is true iff the set of best worlds entails φ . On our proposal, required φ is
true iff the probability of φ , conditional on the world being one of the best worlds,
is 1.42 Here is a schematic entry (for simplicity, we incorporate the compositional
contribution of POS directly in the truth conditions).
(135) [[pos required φ ]]w, f ,g = 1 iff Pr(w : [[φ ]]w, f ,g = 1|{w′ : w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w))})=
1
For current purposes, we leave open how the notion of probability in (135) should
be interpreted. Plausibly, in some cases (broadly, subjective uses of deontic modals)
it will represent the credences of the speaker or a group of agents, while in others
(broadly, objective uses) it will capture an objective notion of probability (be it
chance, evidential probability in the sense of Williamson 2000, or something else).43
As usual, allowed can be defined as the dual of required: allowed φ is true just
in case the probability of φ , conditional on the proposition including all best worlds
in the modal base, is non-zero .
42 We are assuming a standard way of defining conditional probability as a ratio:
Pr(q|p) = Pr(p∧q)
Pr(p)
43 Let us point out that our basic maneuver — replacing a quantifier with a probability function — is
compatible with a more radical departure from Kratzer. Our semantics still singles out a set of ‘best’
worlds via an ordering source. But one might also single out best worlds in a different way — e.g., as
worlds via expected utility. Our main reason for sticking to a more conservative setup here is that the
latter already yields all that we need.
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(136) [[pos allowed φ ]]w, f ,g = 1 iff Pr(w : [[φ ]]w, f ,g = 1|
{w′ : w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w))})> 0
It’s easy to check that this analysis renders modals monotonic in prejacent position,
hence the two problems we pointed out in 8.2.1 are sidestepped.
8.2.3 Predicting possibility inferences
Let us show that the analysis, like its counterpart for epistemic modals, predicts all
the possibility inferences we observe via a unified mechanism. Let’s focus first on
required, which we take to have the entry:
(137) [[required]]w, f ,g = λd. λ p. Pr(p | {w′ : w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w))})≥ d
Assuming composition of POS in the usual way, (127) is predicted to have the
truth-conditions in (138):
(127) You are POS required to take Syntax or Logic.
(138) [[(127)]] = 1 iff Pr( Syntax ∨ Logic | BEST )= 1
As usual, we derive distributive inferences via exhaustification. We assume that, on
its strengthened reading, (127) is parsed as including an occurrence of EXH (which
we assume to be below POS, though the issue is of no consequence in this case).
(139) POS [λd1 [ EXH[ [d1 required] [ that you take Syntax or Logic]]]]
Given standard assumption about alternatives, the truth conditions of (140) are:
(140) [[(139)]] = 1 iff Pr( Syntax ∨ Logic | BEST ) =1∧
Pr( Syntax | BEST ) < 1∧ Pr( Logic | BEST ) < 1
As above, (140), in turn, entails (141).
(141) Pr( Syntax ∨ Logic | BEST ) = 1 ∧ ∃d[d > 0∧Pr( Syntax | BEST )] ∧
∃d[d > 0∧Pr( Logic | BEST ) > d]
(141), given our meaning for allowed, yields the relevant possibility inferences.
(127) You are required to take Syntax or Logic.
a.  You are allowed to take Syntax
b.  You are allowed to take Logic
The same account holds for possibility inferences with allowed. In analogy with
what we have done so far, we assume the following entry:
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(142) [[allowed]]w, f ,g = λd. λ p. Pr(p | {w′ : w′ ∈ BESTg(w)( f (w))})≥ d
The basic LF of (126) (assuming that the modal takes wide scope with respect to the
subject) is in (143):
(126) You are allowed to take Syntax or Logic
(143) POS [ λd1 [[d1 allowed] [ you take Syntax or Logic]]]
Given our assumptions about POS and the entry in (142), the schematic truth condi-
tions of (126) are:
(144) [[(126)]] = 1 iff ∃d[d > 0∧Pr(you take S or L | BEST )≥ d]
Free choice is derived, exactly as it happens for epistemic modals, by using an
exhaustivity operator that takes scope above the modal, but below POS. Hence, on
the exhaustified reading, (126) has the LF:
(145) POS [λd1 [ EXH [[d1 allowed] [you take Syntax or Logic]]]]
Given standard assumption about alternatives, the truth conditions of (145) are:
(146) [[(145)]] = ∃d [d > 0∧Pr( Syntax ∨ Logic | BEST )≥ d ∧ Pr( Syntax |
BEST )< d ∧ Pr( Logic | BEST )< d]
The truth conditions in (146) entail, among other things:
(147) ∃d[Pr( Syntax | BEST ) > d] ∧ ∃d[Pr( Logic | BEST ) > d]
which gives us the free choice inferences, repeated below in (148).
(148) You are allowed to take Syntax or Logic.
a.  You are allowed to take Syntax
b.  You are allowed to take Logic
8.3 Other modals
Epistemic and deontic modals are the paradigm examples of modals giving rise to
possibility inferences. But these inferences have been discussed also in connection
with modals of other flavor. One interesting case is that of ability modals. Ability
modals give rise to possibility inferences in some cases, but block them in others.
For a case of the latter kind, consider (149) (from Nouwen 2016).44
44 See also van Tiel 2011 for experimental evidence suggesting that ability modals are not associated to
free choice inferences like deontic and epistemic modals are.
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(149) ??My son can walk or talk.
(149) is pretty odd with the intended free choice interpretation that my son can walk
and my son can talk. On the other hand, there are clear cases where ability modals
clearly give rise to possibility inferences, like (150) (from Geurts 2010) or that in
(151) from Klinedinst 2007).
(150) Betty can balance a fishing rod on her chin or her nose.
a.  Betty can balance a fishing rod on her chin
b.  Betty can balance a fishing rod on her nose
(151) Jenny can outsmart a doctor or a lawyer.
a.  Jenny can outsmart a doctor
b.  Jenny can outsmart a lawyer
Here we don’t have space to discuss these modals, in particular with respect to
the contrast between (149), on the one hand, and (150) and (151), on the other (see
Nouwen 2016 for a proposal). But let us point out that our account could in principle
be extended to ability modals. The trick is, again, to decompose the meaning of
ability modals in a measure function and a kind of quantifier over degrees, and insert
an exhaustivity operator between the two — i.e., to treat ability modals that give rise
to free choice as exploiting the usual configuration:
(152) POS [EXH [MODAL (p∨q)]]
Again, this can be done by replacing all-or-nothing logical notions like consistency
and entailment with probabilistic notions. For a toy example45, suppose that we
treat can as a possibility modal operating over an appropriately restricted set of
possibilities. Much like the semantics for epistemic modals above, can φ will say
that the probability of its prejacent is non-zero . The resulting truth conditions for
(153) are in (154):
(153) Jenny can outsmart a doctor.
(154) ∃d[d > 0∧Pr([[Jenny outsmarts a doctor]])≥ d]
45 See, among many, Mandelkern et al. 2015 for arguments to the effect that semantics in this vein suffer
from serious empirical problems.
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9 Other issues
9.1 Wide scope disjunction and some other cases of free choice
Up to now, we have only considered instances of free choice where the modal
operator takes wide scope over disjunction. But it is well-known that free choice
inferences are generated also in cases where disjunction appears to take scope over
the modal(s). e.g., (155) suggests that rain is possible, and that so is snow (Legrand
1975, Zimmerman 2000, Geurts 2005, Simons 2005, Fox 2007 among others).
(155) It’s possible that it will rain or it’s possible that it will snow.
a.  it’s possible that it will rain
b.  it’s possible that it will snow
The present proposal, like most other implicature-based accounts, doesn’t address
this puzzle.46 But let us observe that it is compatible with independent accounts of
wide scope free choice, and in particular with attempts at reducing wide scope free
choice to narrow scope free choice via syntactic or semantic means. (See e.g., the
proposal in Simons 2005, on which in a sentence like (155) the modal undergoes
covert movement and takes scope over disjunction; though see also Alonso Ovalle
2005, §4.13, for some substantial problems with Simons’ proposal.)
Second, free choice obtains also with negated conjunction, as noticed by Fox
2007.
(156) It’s not certain that we will hire Mary and Sue.
a.  it’s possible that we will not hire Mary
b.  it’s possible that we will not hire Sue
In our framework, the inferences in (156a) and (156b) can be derived by using two
exhaustivity operators — one below and, and one above POS, as in (157).
(157) EXH[ not [POS [EXH[ certain [that we will hire Mary and Sue]]]]]
To see how this works, consider the lower EXH first. The relevant alternatives are:
(158)

d certain that we will hire Mary or Sue Pr(Mary∨Sue)≥ d
d certain that we will hire Mary Pr(Mary)≥ d
d certain that we will hire Sue Pr(Sue)≥ d
d certain that we will hire Mary and Sue Pr(Mary∧Sue)≥ d

46 Ciardelli et al. (2011) is an exception to this. Some semantics account of free choice, e.g., Zimmerman
2000 or Geurts 2005, also do not have this problem.
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The prejacent is stronger than all alternatives, so EXH is vacuous here. It does,
however, change the alternatives which are then fed to the second EXH (represented
in (159)). In particular, the negated exhaustified disjunctive alternative is crucial
once the second exhaustivity operator enters the derivation.
(159)

not[POS[EXH[d certain . . . Mary and Sue]]] ¬[Pr(Mary∧Sue) = 1]
not[POS[EXH[d certain . . . Mary]]] ¬[Pr(Mary) = 1∧Pr(Sue)< 1]
not[POS[EXH[d certain . . . Sue]]] ¬[Pr(Mary) = 1∧Pr(Sue)< 1]
not[POS[EXH[d certain . . . Mary or Sue]]] ¬[Pr(M∨S) = 1∧Pr(M)< 1∧Pr(S)< 1]

The second EXH quantifies over the alternatives above and the result is in (160).
That is, we conclude that the probability of hiring Mary and Sue is less than one,
that hiring one or the other is 1, and, crucially, that the probability of neither disjunct
is 1. As a result, we derive the relevant possibility inferences.
(160) ¬[Pr(M∧S) = 1]∧Pr(M∨S) = 1∧Pr(M)< 1∧Pr(S)< 1
9.2 Brief comparison with alternative proposals
We don’t have the space to compare in detail the present proposal to the other
accounts in the literature. But let us make some brief remarks about its relation to
two successful scalar approaches, i.e. those in Fox (2007) and Klinedinst (2007).47
Let us start with Fox’s account. Fox assumes a standard existential analysis of
possibility modals. Free choice is derived by assuming that sentences like (161) are
parsed as involving two exhaustivity operators, as in (162).
(161) It is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
(162) EXH[EXH[it is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue]]
The crucial element of the account is that the outermost EXH exploits alternatives
that have been already exhaustified. In particular, the latter alternatives include the
exhaustified disjuncts.
(163)

. . .
EXH[It is possible that we will hire Mary] ♦Mary∧¬♦Sue
EXH[It is possible that we will hire Sue] ♦Sue∧¬♦Mary
. . .

47 We leave a comparison with other scalar-implicature based accounts (e.g., Chemla 2010, Franke
2011, van Rooij 2010) and to semantic accounts (e.g., Zimmerman 2000, Geurts 2005, Barker 2010,
Starr 2016) for future research.
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This in turn means that the second EXH winds up negating the exhaustified alterna-
tives above, giving rise to free choice as in (164).
(164) [[exh[exh[it is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue]]]] =
♦(Mary∨Sue)∧¬[♦Mary∧¬♦Sue]∧¬[♦Sue∧¬♦Mary] =
♦(Mary∨Sue)∧♦Mary↔ ♦Sue =
♦(Mary∨Sue)∧♦Mary∧♦Sue
Fox’s account extends to all types of modals and to nominal quantifiers.48
The advantage that we claim for our account over Fox’s is that we give a unified
story for deriving all possibility inferences. This covers both distributivity inferences
and free choice ones. By contrast, Fox has to resort to different mechanisms for
the two cases. His account of distributive inferences is the one involving ordinary
exhaustification, and sketched in §3; conversely, free choice requires double exhaus-
tification. Of course, this is not enough to establish that our account is overall better.
But it suggests that it deserves consideration as a competitor.
Let us move on to Klinedinst’s (2007) proposal. This is probably the closest
proposal to ours, at least in spirit. Klinedinst derives free choice inferences as a kind
of embedded distributivity implicature, by making a key background assumption,
i.e. that all modals (and, among them, possibility modals) are plural quantifiers over
worlds containing a distributivity operator DIST.49 As a result, (165) says (roughly)
that there is a plurality of worlds such that in each of them we will hire Mary or Sue.
(165) It is possible that we will hire Mary or Sue.
Against this background, Klinedinst’s suggestion is that we embed an exhaustivity
operator below the modal, but above DIST.
(166) It is possible EXH [DIST [we will hire Mary or Sue]]
Crucially, DIST works as a universal quantifier. Since EXH takes scope over a uni-
versal quantifier, Klinedinst can derive free choice much like a standard distributive
inference. The alternatives and the computation of the exhaustified clause are below.
(167)

DIST[we will hire Mary or Sue] ∀w′[Maryw′ ∨Suew′]
DIST[we will hire Mary] ∀w′[Maryw′]
DIST[we will hire Sue] ∀w′[Suew′]
DIST[we will hire Mary and Sue] ∀w′[Maryw′ ∧Suew′]

48 Notice also that Fox’s (2007) account is in principle compatible with ours. That is, it is easy to show
that global recursive exhaustification would give rise to free choice in the same way as above.
49 For an introductory discussion of the semantics of plurals and distributivity operators, see Nouwen
2014, Winter & Scha 2014.
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(168) [[exh[dist[we will hire Mary or Sue]]]] =
∀w′[Maryw′ ∨Suew′]∧¬∀w′[Maryw′]∧¬∀w′[Suew′] =
∀w′[Maryw′ ∨Suew′]∧∃w′[Maryw′]∧∃w′[Suew′] =
Putting all this together we have (169), which entails the usual free choice inferences.
(169) [[it is possible that [exh[dist[we will hire Mary or Sue]]]]] =
∃W [∀w′ ∈W [Maryw′ ∨Suew′]∧∃w′ ∈W [Maryw′]∧∃w′ ∈W [Suew′]]
Like Fox’s account, Klinedinst’s (2007) extends to quantifiers over individuals.
Hence Klinedinst can account for free choice-type inference triggered by plural
quantifiers (as in (170)) with the very same tools.
(170) Some students took three months or didn’t finish at all.
a.  some students took three months
b.  some students didn’t finish at all
A natural worry about Klinedinst’s proposal is that it crucially relies on a plural
semantics for modals, and moreover on the presence of a covert distributivity op-
erator DIST in modal sentences. While there is some evidence for the former, the
latter assumption comes with no independent motivation. In fact, one can easily
raise overgeneration worries about DIST. A theory that assumes the presence of
a distributivity operator predicts that various items should be able to take scope
between the modal and DIST — i.e., exactly where EXH is located on Klinedinst’s
theory. To take a concrete example, consider (171).
(171) Nobody is allowed to enter.
Klinedinst predicts that (171) has, among others, a reading with the following
schematic truth conditions:
(172) ∃W [¬∃x[∀w ∈W [enterw(x)]]] ∃ > Nobody > DIST
(172) says that there is a plurality of (deontically ideal) worlds such that no individual
entered in all of them. I.e., (172) is false only if there is some individual who enters
in all (deontically ideal) worlds; hence, on this reading it should be equivalent to
the most prominent reading of No one is required to enter. Obviously (172) doesn’t
have a reading of this sort.50
50 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this way of putting the point.
Let us notice that Klinedinst could appeal to whatever constraints on scope disallow a similar
reading with other cases involving distributive operators, like bare plurals. Similarly, (i), does not
have a reading which would be true if there is a plurality of students such that no individual met all of
the member of such plurality (but, say, each individual met one of the students).
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Also in this case, this point alone is not enough to give our account a definitive
advantage. For one thing, Klinedinst could appeal to scope constraints that are similar
to the ones we postulate for POS. (Though the latter constraints are independently
motivated in the literature, while to our knowledge no analogous arguments have
been given about DIST.)
Let us also emphasize again that one advantage that, at present, both Fox’s and
Klinedinst’s accounts have over our own account is that both naturally generalize to
free choice-type inferences triggered by nominal quantifiers, like (170). Conversely,
it remains to be seen how our account could be extended beyond modals.51 This is
one of the issues we have to put off to future work.
9.3 The optionality of free choice
It is an established point in the literature that all possibility inferences, including
free choice ones, are optional effects. For example, consider:
(173) Mary is allowed to take Syntax or Logic.
(173) has a reading that doesn’t imply that Mary is allowed to take Syntax and that
she is allowed to take Logic. Rather, it suggests that the speaker is simply ignorant
about which disjunct is true.52 This reading is sometimes called an ‘ignorance
reading,’ and is brought out by continuations like that in (174).
(174) Mary is allowed to take Syntax or Logic, but I don’t remember which one.
Ignorance readings of this kind are available also for epistemic modals, though
they are somewhat harder to obtain. To generate them, we need a context that
(i) Nobody met students.
On the other hand, it is unclear that the parallelism between plural definites and modals hold when
we move to other contexts. For instance, a non-monotonic case like (ii) can be shown not to have a
reading in which exactly two scopes in between existential quantification and DIST. But it is unclear
that this reading is not there for its plural definite counterpart in (iii).
(ii) Exactly two people are allowed to enter.
(iii) Exactly two people talked to the students.
51 Notice also that in principle our account is compatible with Klinedinst’s account for the nominal
quantifier cases, since the possibility of having a distributivity operator for nominal quantifiers is not
in question.
52 Ignorance inferences standardly arise from a standard Gricean maxim of Quantity not based on
alternatives; see Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007 among others for discussion.
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makes salient a body of information that entails, but it not entailed by, the speaker’s
information. For an example, consider the following scenario.
Department X has voted an offer to a candidate. The details are not
public, but my friend, who is in Department X’s search committee,
has let slip information suggesting that the offer might have gone
to a certain candidate. Unfortunately, I have forgotten whether this
candidate is Mary or Sue.
Against this background, one says:
(175) It’s possible that Department X made an offer to Mary or Sue, but I don’t
remember which.
(175) is perfectly appropriate in this scenario. Moreover, notice that (thanks again to
the conjunct I don’t remember which) the usual possibility inferences are blocked.
Of course, upon hearing (175) we can infer that it’s compatible with the speaker’s
knowledge both that Mary is the recipient of the offer and that Sue is. But possible
in (175) evidently doesn’t merely describe the speaker’s knowledge.
Here we want to point out that our account, on a par with other exhaustivity-
based accounts, has no difficulties predicting the optionality of possibility inferences.
We predict that a sentence like (176) has a number of available parsings.
(176) It’s possible that Department X made an offer to Mary or Sue.
In 7.1, we have pointed out that (176) has two parsings that give rise to (slightly)
different possibility inferences:
(177) a. EXH [POS [ likely [ DX made an offer to Mary or Sue ]]]
b. POS [EXH [ likely [ DX made an offer to Mary or Sue ]]]
But we also predict the availability of a parsing that does not involve EXH in any
position:
(178) POS [ likely [ DX made an offer to Mary or Sue ]]
In this case, we predict no implicature at all.
Of course, we also need to say something about when the parsing involving
an exhaustivity operator is available. For concreteness, here we simply rely on the
suggestion in Fox (2007). Fox’s idea is that speakers adopt the exhaustified parsings
to avoid ignorance inferences. More precisely: Fox assumes that speakers will first
attempt to parse a sentence without an exhaustivity operator. If this parsing gives
47
Paolo Santorio and Jacopo Romoli
rise to ignorance inferences, the sentence is reparsed as involving one (or possibly
more) occurrences of EXH.
10 Conclusion
Disjunctions in the scope of epistemic modals give rise to scalar inferences to the
effect that each disjunct is epistemically possible. These inferences are usually
called and treated differently. Those generated by non-possibility modals are labeled
‘distributive inferences,’ and derived as scalar implicatures. Those generated by pos-
sibility modals are called ‘free choice inferences’ and are derived via more complex
mechanisms. We have showed that, by adopting a degree semantics for modals, we
can give a unified account of all these effects as standard scalar implicatures.
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